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In this article I would like to articulate the role of Stoic philosophy as a pos-
sible underlying philosophical framework that supported the so called ‘Neo-Arian’ 
theology1 represented by Aetius and Eunomius, the fourth century protagonists of 
the Arian movement. This movement can be thought of as a result of self-reassess-
ment and regrouping of Arianism in the second half of the fourth century C.E. 
This time was marked by the Trinitarian debate reaching the state of philosophical 
subtlety as a number of great rhetoricians joined the controversy. As of today we 
know a lot about the historical course of events of the controversy and of its major 
protagonists. However, the very nature of their reasoning is still unclear due to the 
general lack of knowledge about the competing philosophical paradigms of the 
time. That is why it is no surprise that contemporary scholarship is quite uncertain 
about the philosophical roots of the controversy and about the nature of reasoning 
used during the clash between two competing views on the inner life of the trinity 
and the relationship between its hypostases. To overcome such uncertainty an 
appeal is made to the arguments made by the adversaries of Aetius and Eunomius 
and to the classifications that come out of their circles. Thus many scholars out of 
anxiety naturally retire to the safe resort of the ancients to make sense of a highly 
eclectic philosophical theology of Neo-Arians.
The popular textbook evaluation of the movement attributes the philosophi-
cal roots of Neo-Arianism to Aristotelian philosophy. Some highly respected 
monographs follow the same line of evaluation.2 Though this attribution is not 
completely invalid, it is quite clear as of today that it is outdated and needs schol-
arly re-assessment. Among the reasons for such a state of affairs are the follow-
ing: a complete reliance on certain arguments made by the Cappadocian Fathers 
(namely, Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa) and the 
church historians of the time (Socrates) who classified Neo-Arians as Aristotelians 
1 This term coined in the twentieth century is in a sense artificial and introduced for the 
purposes of creating a new taxonomy capable of distinguishing various doctrinal differences that clas-
sify early and late Arianism. 
2 For example, R.P.C. Hanson is his monumental The Search for the Christian Doctrine 
of God suggested that “…Aetius meets them [his adversaries] to this extent upon their own ground 
with acuteness, learning and a great display of basically Aristotelian logic.” It is thus no surprise that 
Hanson immediately retires to St. Basil who “as a deacon retreated before the formidable machine of 
Aetius’ logic”. 2005. p. 610. This comment immediately indicates the source of Hanson’s suggestion. 
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as both are unbegotten (agegnetos) in the first sense of begotenness, and that the 
unbegotten ousia of the Son is the same as that of the Father due to its nature as, 
using the Aristotelian philosophical jargon, essential universal being (say, the form 
of divinity), and as the being of the Father (following the Aristotelian schema—
non-accidental particular being) and of the Son (another non-accidental particular 
being) both indicate a natural relation to the same type of universal being under 
which they both fall, or which they both manifest. Based on the argument just 
reviewed one might immediately notice the use of Aristotelian philosophy by the 
Cappadocians. Thus I would like to suggest Basil’s Contra Eunomium is more 
indebted to Aristotle than both the Syntagmation of Aetius and the First Apology 
of Eunomius.  
Now it seems to me that the nature of reasoning found in the Syntagma-
tion and the conceptual content of the notion of ousia used in this collection of 
propositions are the key points that can open the door to discernability of the 
subject at stake (namely, the philosophical roots of the Neo-Arian movement). 
Here I will explore those roots and will argue for their particular originative source 
which I will attribute to the popular Stoic philosophy of the time that could be 
found in logical manuals designed to provide a brief excurse to Zeno’ and Chrysy-
pus’ philosophy. It is interesting to note that only a few scholars have indicated the 
connection between the Syntagmation and the Apologies of Eunomius and the Stoic 
philosophical heritage. For instance Richard Norris4 and David Robertson, among 
others, can be credited for uncovering this important link (though they were able 
to point out the link but did not provide an explanation for such a connection).
In the mid twentieth century Harry A. Wolfson in his essay “The Philosoph-
ical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism” pointed out: 
Patristic opponents of Arianism as well as Patristic Church historians 
and heresiographers trace the Arian heresy to Aristotle. Thus Aristotle 
is mentioned as the source of the teaching of the various Arians by 
Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Socrates Scholasticus, and Epiphanius. But 
when we study the passages in which Aristotle is mentioned as the 
source of this heresy, we are surprised to discover that the reference is 
not to any particular theory with which the name of Aristotle is gener-
ally associated…but only to the Aristotelian method of reasoning. 
Thus they always speak in this connection of Aristotle’s syllogisms, or 
of Aristotle’s dialectics, or of Aristotle’s systematical treatment of the 
art of reasoning…5
Interestingly enough the attribution of the "Aristotelian method of 
reasoning" to the Neo-Arians was quite univocally accepted by scholars so that 
4 As Frederick Norris in his “Of Thorns and Roses: The Logic of Belief in Gregory Nazian-
zen” noted, the major source of inspiration for the Neo-Arians comes from the Aristotelian and Stoic 
sources, as they “borrowed devices from Aristotle and Chrysippus.” p.459.
5 Harry A. Wolfson. “Philosophical Implication of Arianism and Apollinarianism.” 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers,  Vol. 12 (1958), p. 6.
using a particular rhetorical trope to persuade the audience that the metaphysi-
cal and thus non-scriptural nature of arguments made by Aetius and Eunomius 
diverge from the mainstream Christianity of the fourth entury as being over-
Hellenized and therefore loses its connection with Christian piety. By the fourth 
century Aristotelian philosophy was considered to be the most sophisticated and, 
in a sense, arcane system of thought, perfectly representing Hellenism which was 
perceived with a high level of suspicion by many Christians. Not many theologians 
were willing to subscribe to it at the time. This rhetorical trope thus should not be 
taken for granted.3 
Another argument in defense of the attribution of Neo-Arians to Aristo-
telian philosophy is associated with the use of so called Aristotelian syllogistic 
reasoning in the Syntagmation of Aetius. This is just another example of the total 
reliance of contemporary scholars on judgments that came from the adversaries of 
Aetius to persuade the audience that the untenable premises of Aetius’ arguments 
necessarily lead to invalid conclusions as the nature of Christian faith cannot be 
deduced from a few simple premises. Thus, this attribution should not be taken 
for granted either, but rather should be carefully studied and historically substan-
tiated. It is this lack of historical substantiation of the philosophical roots of the 
movement that make it quite incomprehensible for students of church history. 
How can it be otherwise if a student is not able to find any traces of the Aristote-
lian syllogistic reasoning in the Syntagmation? This was precisely my impression 
when I read it the first time. 
Now, the key points articulated by Aetius in his Syntagmation were the 
following: The unbegotten or ingenerate ousia (for now I will defer translating 
the term ousia) is essentially different from the begotten ousia and thus cannot 
be placed in line with it. Thus, the unbegotten God retains a higher rank in the 
schema of ta onta (beings). It produces or begets the only begotten God who, in 
turn, begets God the Spirit. Thus, there is a subordination between these three 
deities who represent three different types of ousiai and thus differ in essence from 
each other and from all other things that came into being through the creative 
activity of God the Son and God the Spirit. 
It should be noted here that there was a significant terminological confu-
sion over the notion of begotten or generated. There are three kinds of things that 
might be translated as begotten that should be taken into account in the context 
of the polemic: gegnesenta, genesenta, poiesenta (genoma, gegnoma, poiema/ktisma). 
Thus, the thing that is begotten in a sense of natural transmission of qualities of 
the species of living beings is juxtaposed to things that come into being and seize 
to exist, and thing that are made out of  the will of the maker (which normally 
refers to the products of imitative arts and crafts). The etymology of the first type 
is biological, so to say.  The second type is physical, and the third type artistic. 
The Neo-Arians used the terms interchangeably and did not discriminate between 
meanings which gave a good reason to the Cappadocians to say that the unbegot-
ten ousia of the Father can be legitimately compared to the ousia of the stone, 
3 A very interesting discussion about texne of the Arians and their reliance on the “naked 
persuasiveness without regard for truth” can be found in Vaggion (2000) pp. 93-5.
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lian syllogisms from these of the Stoics that allow for the conclusion to be identical 
with one of the premises. 
It is obvious that Aetius uses sentential logic as the basic units of his ‘syl-
logisms’ in the Syntagmation as propositions. The basic syllogistic forms there, as 
I will argue, are also Stoic or reducible to the five indemonstrable forms of the 
Stoics. Moreover, the fact that the use of the conclusion identical to one of the 
premises (that can be found in the Syntagmation and which violates one of the ba-
sic principles of Aristotle’s syllogistic) demonstrates the non-Aristotelian origin of 
Aetius’ arguments. On the other hand, the absence of some (missing) premises in 
the arguments used in the Syntagmation, in my opinion, do not tell us much about 
the type of reasoning, but rather reveal Aetius’ training in rhetoric.
Firstly, as one might note, it is not uncommon to see missing premises in 
the Syntagmation. Thus some propositions offer only one premise instead of two 
that constitute demonstrative syllogisms. In this light one might suggest that the 
arguments that can be found there represent Aristotle’s enthymemes, incomplete 
syllogisms where the minor or major premise or conclusion is missing and must be 
supplied by the audience. However, the mere presence of two terms in an argu-
ment might not indicate that the nature of reasoning is non-syllogistic. Moreover, 
the arguments here are given in the form of conditionals (if-then). This again 
might be seen as quite acceptable for demonstrative syllogisms as Aristotle himself 
often used the conditional form in his syllogistic stretches of reasoning. What 
is really problematic in the Syntagmation, is that the propositions offered do not 
provide any traces of figures of syllogism and rules of inference that characterize 
Aristotelian predicate logic. It is quite evident that Aetius is familiar neither with 
Aristotle’s proper syllogistic figures nor with the rules of inference. Thus, his rea-
soning found in the Syntagmation cannot be classified through the use of weak syl-
logisms.
I, however, think it is rather propositional logic of the Stoics that should be 
taken as the starting point of Aetius’ reasoning. The reason for such classification 
is that Aetius’ arguments (sentential and not predicate) do not run by the way of 
predicate or term logic. It is thus rather the Stoic propositional logic with its five 
indemonstrable forms that give way to the Syntagmation ((if p then q; p; therefore q 
(modus ponens); if p then q; not q; therefore not-p (modus tollens); it is not the case 
that both p and q; p; therefore not-q; either p or q; p; therefore not-q; either p or q; 
not p; therefore q)). This is precisely how the arguments run in the Syntagmation. 
Now let us take a look at the arguments offered in the Syntagmation. The 
second proposition, taken as an example here, is stated by Aetius in the following 
way: “If the ingenerate Deity is superior to all cause, he must for that reason be su-
perior to origination; if he is superior to all cause clearly that includes origination, 
for he neither received existence from another nature nor conferred it on himself.” 
[2] This proposition of the Syntagmation can be reconstructed in the following 
way: If the ingenerate Deity is superior to all cause, he must for that reason be su-
perior to origination (if p then q); if he is superior to all cause clearly that includes 
origination (p therefore q). For he neither received existence from another nature 
nor conferred it on himself. The use of modus ponens is easily identifiable here: If 
such attribution has never become a point of contention in the academy. It is my 
conjecture, however, that Aetius, who was meant to be the primary example of 
the use of the Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning in the fourth century, as a matter 
of fact, never used the Aristotelian syllogisms in his Syntagmation. On the first 
glance this judgment might seem to be unjustified or classified as a product of 
imagination of the amateur theologian, given the fact of the mutual agreement on 
this point by various scholars. However, I have a hope that the following analysis 
will substantiate my claim. 
It should be noted in this context that the word "syllogism" is normally 
translated as deduction, conclusion, inference, etc. The etymology of the term is: 
to put thoughts together. There are various kinds of syllogisms offered by the late 
antique philosophers. The Aristotelian syllogisms are tied to a particular system of 
logic, namely, term or predicate logic. The syllogisms offered by, say, Chrysippus, 
are intrinsically connected with a different type of logic—propositional or senten-
tial logic. These syllogisms therefore have different forms and follow different rules 
of inference. 
Lukasiewicz and Mates identified the difference between Aristotle’s and Sto-
ic logical systems as twofold. Firstly, “Stoic logic was a logic of propositions, while 
Aristotelian logic was a logic of classes”6 meaning that “the values of the variables 
appearing in Stoic formulae are propositions (the substituends being sentences), 
while the values of Aristotelian variables are non-empty classes (the corresponding 
terms being the substituends).”7 Moreover, “Stoic logic was “a theory of inference-
schemas, while Aristotelian logic was a theory of logically true matrices.”8
Despite the structural differences in Aristotelian and Stoic syllogisms, such 
words as syllogism, syllogistic reasoning, etc., are commonly associated with the 
works of Aristotle. This unfortunate conflation of different types of logical theories 
leads to much confusion for the scholars of church history. 
Aristotle defined syllogism in the following way “A syllogism is discourse 
in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows 
of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they produce the 
consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order 
to make the consequence necessary.” [Prior Analytics. I.24.b.20] Two things are 
important in this regard. Firstly, that the conclusions ought to be different from 
what is supposed. This assumption necessarily eliminates arguments in which 
the conclusion and one of the premises are identical. Secondly, the reference to 
“certain things having been stated” rules out arguments with missing premises. 
However, the use of one premise was allowed by Aristotle for the incomplete syl-
logism, enthymeme. The first point is especially important in this context for the 
purposes of proper identification of syllogisms as it allows distinguishing Aristote-
6 Mates, 2.
7 Mates, 2 footnote.
8 Ibid., 2-3.
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existence from another nature. Therefore, the essence of the generate Deity did not 
receive existence from another nature. However, it is said that that the generate 
Deity was generated by the ingenerate Deity, and thus received existence from an-
other nature; therefore, the essence of generate Deity is different from the essence 
of the ingenerate Deity.
This can be converted to E∨B; E; ∴¬B and thus can be reduced to the 
following form: it is not the case that both p and q; p; therefore not-q. Thus, it is 
not the case that both p and q (it is not the case that the same essence to be both 
generate and ingenerate); p (the essence of the offspring is generate); therefore not-q 
(therefore, it is not generated by surrendering if essence and is thus not-ingenerate). 
This argument can also be reduced to the following form: either p or q; not p; 
therefore q. Thus, either p or q (either what was generated was generated by surren-
dering of essence or was posited by the power); not p (what was generated was not gen-
erated by surrendering of essence); therefore q (it was posited by the power). Reductio 
ad absurdum immediately follows.
These examples clearly demonstrate that the figures of syllogism and the 
rules of inference that can be found in the Syntagmation are taken from Stoic logic. 
It is clear from these considerations that the use of Aristotelian syllogistic reason-
ing should not be attributed to the Neo-Arians. It can be found neither in the 
Syntagmation of Aetius, nor in the Apologies of Eunomius. It is rather propositional 
logic (the use of indemonstrable syllogisms and their derivatives) of the Stoics that 
is offered in the Syntagmation.  
Another way of looking at the arguments provided in the Syntagmation was 
suggested by R.P.C. Hanson who attempted to articulate the paradoxical character 
of Aetius’ arguments. Thus, he suggested that the Syntagmation consists of “the 37 
propositions, all couched in the form of an aporia, i.e. a problem to which in his 
comment he tries to show there is no solution of the ousia of the Son is like to or 
identical with that of the Father.”9 For example, “the first aporia begins in charac-
teristic fashion: ‘is it possible for the ingenerate God to make something generate 
ingenerate?’”10 However, this is the only example of a genuine (logically indiscern-
ible in its unqualified form) aporia offered in the Syntagmation. There are a number 
of apparent aporai (for example: 23, 24) offered there and normally indicated by 
special markers: ‘can,’ ‘how can,’ ‘how will,’ etc. However, all those apparent para-
doxes are immediately resolved by the proposed solution. 
It is also true that most of the propositions can be classified by an excessive 
use of reductio ad absurdum making reference to the Law of Non-Contradiction 
and appealing to the impossibility for the subject to be characterized by the 
compresence of opposites. However, the use of such reduction does not signify an 
existence of genuine paradoxes but rather attempts to demonstrate that the denial 
of certain premises (in particular, that the ousia of the ingenerate God is different 
from that of the generate one) will inevitably lead (referring to the contra-argu-
ments offered by his adversaries) to absurdities. Thus, the purpose in this context 
9 Ibid., 607.
10 Ibid.
p (x is superior to all cause), then q (x is superior to origination); p (x is superior to 
all cause), therefore q (x is superior to origination). P→Q; P; ∴Q. The syllogistic 
figure of Aristotle’s logic (say, Barbara) would have had a following structure: A is 
B; B is C; therefore, A is C; ‘that which is ingenerate is superior to all cause’ (major 
term); ‘X is ingenerate’ (minor term); ‘therefore, X is superior to all cause’ (conclu-
sion). ‘The superiority to cause is superiority origination’; ‘X is superior to cause’; 
‘therefore, X is superior to origination’. 
Now the argument continues: 
If he did not confer existence on himself (not because of ineffective-
ness of nature but by virtue of his complete transcendence of cause) 
how could anyone grant that the nature which is posited is indistin-
guishable in essence from the nature which posited it, when such a 
substance does not admit of origination? [3]
This is clearly a disjunctive syllogism (P∨Q) that can be reduced to one of 
the basic forms, say: it is not the case that both p and q; p; therefore not-q; either p 
or q; p; therefore not-q (P∨Q; P; ∴¬Q); either p or q; not p; therefore q (P∨Q; Q; 
∴¬P)
Let us try to connect these two propositions (2&3) and express them in 
formulae. A = x is superior to all cause; B = x is superior to origination; C = x con-
ferred existence in himself; D = x received existence from another nature. E = x is 
the nature posited. Now: A→B; A; ∴B; B→ ¬C; B→ ¬D; B (¬C∧¬D); B¬(C∧D); 
missing premise: E→D∧¬C; E (D∧¬C); ∴B∨E. Suppose: B→E; Reductio ad 
Absurdum: B¬(C∧D)→ E (¬C∧D); B (¬D)→E (D); B∙E → ¬D∧D; Impossible; 
∴B∨E. Thus. If the ingenerate Deity is superior to all cause, he must be superior 
to origination; he is superior to all cause; therefore, he is superior to origination; 
he neither received existence from another nature nor conferred it on himself; the 
generate Deity received existence from another nature and did not confer it on 
himself; therefore the ingenerate Deity is distinguishable from the generate Deity. 
The implicit reductio ad absurdum provides an indirect proof of it.  
Another argument runs is the following way: 
If the Deity is ingenerate in essence, what was generated was not gen-
erated by surrendering of essence but he posited it by his power. For 
no reverent reasoning permits the same essence to be both generate 
and ingenerate. [5] 
Thus, E→¬B∧D; B→¬D; ∴E∨B; suppose, E→B; Reductio ad Absurdum, 
B→¬D; ∴E→¬D; but E→D; ∴E∨B. Thus, the generate Deity was not generated 
by surrendering of essence (as in this case it will be ingenerate) but was posited by 
the power of the ingenerate Deity (i.e., received existence from another nature); 
the essence of the ingenerate Deity is ingenerate; therefore, the ingenerate Deity is 
different from the generate Deity; for, suppose, the generate Deity was generated 
by surrendering of essence. The essence of the ingenerate Deity did not receive 
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conventionally ascribe names to entities during the process of conceptualization. 
It is rather a God given name. Thus, it has an essential connection with its referent 
[12,13,16,28]. 
Now it is time to compare this description of ousia with those that we can 
find in Aristotle and the Stoics. But before that one important question should be 
answered, namely, whether the notion of ousia in Aetius signifies particular/indi-
vidual or universal type of being. It seems on the first glance that it is definitely 
particular as it cannot be shared by two or more entities (universal being, on the 
contrary, might have various manifestations and thus can be shared, or partici-
pated in, by many entities). Ingeneratness then might be thought of as an idion, 
a property of the Deity, or a certain quality of the Deity predicated to its ousia 
(which signifies a particular being). However, the statement that the ousia of the 
ingenerate Deity is ingenerate and is “superior to quality, quantity, and, in a word, 
all change” [22]; and ingeneratness is its ousia (the terms reciprocate here) does not 
fit well into such understanding [28]. If the very nature or the ousia of the ingener-
ate Deity is its ingeneratness, the ousia of the ingenerate Deity rather represents a 
universal type of being. Is there a way out of this aporia? I think there is. But first 
let us look at the notion of ousia as given in the Categories. 
Here two criteria are offered, namely, said-of and present-in. Based on these 
criteria four types of beings are offered: said-of and present-in; said-of and not-
present-in; not-said-of and present-in; not-said-of and not-present-in. It is the last 
kind that is classified as ousia (first or primary ousia). Thus, it is a non-accidental 
(not-present-in) particular (not-said-of) being. It is not predicated (said-of) of 
anything but everything is predicated of it (except other ousiai). It is not present in 
anything. Can this type of being be classified as representing Aetius’ ousia. It defi-
nitely cannot. On the first place it seems that since Aetius’ ousia cannot be shared 
it is an individual being and thus can be well reconciled with the Aristotelian no-
tion of primary ousia. However, since Aetius’ ousia is ingenerate and ingeneratness 
is the ousia of the Deity, such ousia is definitely said-of (predicated) and thus seems 
to be rather a universal being. Therefore, it is clear that one cannot identify the no-
tion of ousia as presented in the Categories with the one given in the Syntagmation.
Now let us look at the notion of ousia as defined in the Metaphysics Z, 
namely, the most specific species (a narrow version of the notion of secondary ousia 
of the Categories). Here ousia represents universal type of being. Thus, it can be 
shared (participated in) by many individual entities. This possibility excludes the 
most specific species from the list of possible conceptual sources of Aetius. More-
over, it seems impossible to frame the ousia of the ingenerate Deity into the schema 
of genus and differentiae. Aristotle could do it with his unmoved mover. The genus 
mover is qualified by the differentiae of unmoved. Thus, there are two types of 
movers, unmoved and moved, that qualify God and other movers. But in the Syn-
tagmation it does not seem to be the case. One can suggest here that the ingenerate 
Deity has Godhead as its genus and unbegotenness as a qualifier (differentiae). It 
seems plausible. One can say that two types of Deities are qualified by begotenness 
and unbegotenness. Thus, we have unbegotten Deity and begotten Deity. The use 
of negative predicates is not a subject of concern here. The problematic aspect of 
is to demonstrate that premises offered by his adversaries are untenable, capable of 
being reduced to absurdities (being self-contradictory) and thus fallacious.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the use of Chrysippus’ indemon-
strable forms (and their derivatives) is combined with the use of reductio ad absur-
dum. It is interesting that the use of reductio ad absurdum on the first glance might 
indicate certain knowledge of Aristotle who, as a matter of fact, extensively used it 
in his Prior Analytics. Where can this type of combination be found? However, this 
type of combination was quite extensively used by Cleanthes.11 Thus, this combi-
nation seems to be common for the Stoics as well as for most of the late antique 
philosophers who used this proof by contradiction extensively.
Thus, it is my conjecture, that most of the arguments offered in the Syntag-
mation can be reduced to the five indemonstrable forms of the Stoics that go in 
conjuncture with arguments couched in reductio ad absurdum form and never leave 
the subject matter in the state of aporia.  
Secondly, Aetius’ notion of ousia might be said to be derived from Aris-
totle.12 However, neither the Categories, nor the Metaphysics Z provide enough 
evidence of such conceptual connection. Now the question is the following: what 
is the meaning of ousia as it can be found in the Syntagmation? The notion of ousia, 
as one might point out, represents one of the most complex concepts of antiquity. 
In the twentieth century monographs it might be translated as substance, essence, 
existence, being, and subsistence. Its lexical form is the feminine participial of eine 
(being) and its conceptual content varies from one manuscript to another. The 
classical expositions of the notion in antiquity are associated mainly with Aristotle 
and Chrysippus. However, it is not to say that it does not play a significant role 
in other philosophers (a recent example of Silverman’s Plato’s Dialectic of Essence 
([ousia]) demonstrates the importance of the notion of ousia for the middle and 
late platonic dialogues).  
In the Syntagmation we can find that the ousia of the ingenerate Deity is in-
generate or unbegotten [1-5]. It is simple, immutable, completely transcendent as a 
cause, and is superior to its effects [2,3,17,32]. The notions of homoousion (same in 
ousia) and homoiousian (like in ousia) are rejected as perverse doctrines for the fol-
lowing reasons: the ousia of the ungenerate Deity cannot be shared or transferred 
to another entity due to its simplicity and immutability [4]. It abides within the 
boundaries of its own nature which is ingenerate [4]. It did not receive existence 
from another nature nor conferred it on himself [2]. That which is generated or 
came-to-be (its offspring), in other words the only begotten Deity, was generated 
not by surrendering of ousia but was posited by the power or will of the ingener-
ate Deity [5]. It did not exist in the ingenerate deity as a germ (spermatikos here 
reminds us of the notion of Logos Spermatikos and logoi spermatikoi of the Stoics) 
as the ousia of the ingenerate Deity is simple and thus not capable of being shared 
[9]. Its only qualifier is ingenerateness or unbegotenness [2,12]. The name ‘ingener-
ate’ does not represent the product of discursive capacities of human beings who 
11 See Luke Gelinas and P.A. Maijer.
12 Hanson again.
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that is so easily traceable in the fourth century controversy over the nature of the 
Triune God. It is thus my conjecture that the philosophical roots of Neo-Arianism 
can be found in the popular stoic philosophy of the time. 
such approach, however, comes from Aetius who insisted that unbegotenness or 
ingenerateness does not represent a quality. Thus, it cannot function as a qualifier 
(differentiae) for the genus of Godhead. 
I will suggest in this context that we should rather look at the Stoic notion of 
ousia as a starting point. The language of partition and sharing of ousia [5,6,7] in 
the Syntagmation is a great stumbling block that confuses the readers and simulta-
neously redirects their attention to the Stoic notion of ousia. 
In Zeno and Chrysypus ousia is an individual existing material being which 
cannot be shared and which upon the event of being mixed with other beings 
either preserves its identity (which was the reason of its extensive use during the 
monophysite controversy a century later), or ceases to exist. All ‘existent’ entities 
in Stoicism are particular. Universals entities, on the contrary, were understood by 
the Stoics as ‘figments of the mind’, or products of invention of human discursive 
faculties (concepts of discursive intellect). Thus an apparent universal being, say, 
ingeneratness, is as a matter of fact a non-existent (but subsistent in the mind) say-
able or lecton that qualify ousia. 
Ousia of Aetius is a particular being that cannot be shared with precisely 
one qualifier—ingeneratness. If one assumes that the nature of the qualifier is not 
existent but subsistent, a lecton, or sayable, a mind dependent entity, the aporia of 
individual vs. universal is easily eliminated here and the notion of ousia in Aetius 
becomes more coherent. However, as soon as the sayable and an entity which it 
signifies are concerned, the nature of their connection can be said to be essential or 
intrinsic. Thus, the Arian appeal to essential connection between the name unbe-
gotenness and its referent can be easily preserved.
It is interesting to note that such qualifier as ingenerate was used by the 
Stoics to describe the nature of God as one of the first principles (archai) of the 
universe (along the line with utterly unqualified and inert matter. They identified 
God an eternal reason (logos) or intelligent designing fire which structures mat-
ter in accordance with its plan. It seems that Aetius internalized the notion of the 
ingenerate Deity, removed matter as one of the ungenerated principles, attributed 
the status of ingenerate to God the Father, and  classified God the Logos as the 
generate Deity which is thus the subject of change and mutation, being a Divinity 
of the lower rank.
 Another proof of conceptual connection between the Stoics and Ae-
tius comes from the Stoic assumption that two individually qualified entities as 
incapable of coexisting within the same ousia. It provided a legitimate ground for 
Aetius to reject the notions of homoousian and homoiousion. Thus such individually 
qualified entities as the ingenerate Deity and the generated Deity cannot coexist 
within the same ousia; ousia here cannot be shared. The story of Theon and Dion 
perfectly exemplify this assumption.13
I will thus conclude by saying that by the fourth century C.E. it was Sto-
icism that perfectly manifested a “popular philosophy” which was easily accessible 
through the philosophical manuals of the time. It is precisely this philosophy 
13 For an excellent analysis of this subject see Rist (1969).
